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The recent decision in Obergefell v Hodges 1 provided 
members of the LGBT community with much needed forward 
momentum towards equality. In that opinion, the Supreme 
Court extended the fundamental right of marriage to same-sex 
couples. Therefore, when the court announced it would review 
the case Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, many assumed it would also advance gay rights 
another step. Given the circumstances of the case, such a 
perspective was not unrealistic. The case involved two gay men 
in Colorado who were refused a wedding cake for their 
marriage ceremony by a Denver bakery. It was exactly this 
type of blatant discrimination that Colorado’s anti- 
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discrimination statute (Colorado Anti-discrimination Act also 
known as CADA) 2was supposed to prevent. Despite statutory 
protection, however, similar types of discrimination occur 
regularly. In its amicus brief, for example, the Lambda Legal 
Defense Fund noted “With disturbing frequency, LGBT people 
are confronted by ‘we don’t serve your kind’ refusals and other 
unequal treatment in a wide range of public accommodations 
contexts.” 3 Thus, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
send a message that discrimination at place of public 
accommodation would not be tolerated.   
     Therefore, it came as a disappointment to many that the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision did not rule in favor of the gay 
men or protect this class of individuals. Instead, the court chose 
a very narrow ruling focused on an error in the administrative-
level process. The decision missed an important opportunity to 
establish precedent to protect the LGBT community from 
discrimination.  
 
HISTORY OF THE CASE 
     The controversy began in 2012 when David Mullins and 
Charlie Craig, along with Craig’s mother, went shopping for a 
wedding cake in Colorado. Although they could not get 
married in that state, they planned a ceremony in 
Massachusetts with the reception to follow in Colorado. The 
trio visited a bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.  owned by 
Jack Phillips. There, they looked at a book of cake designs that 
Phillips had created. As the discussion ensued, and it became 
evident to Phillips that the men were talking about a wedding 
for themselves, he refused to continue the discussion, 
explaining that the Company had a policy of not creating 
wedding cakes for same-sex couples.  He offered to make them 
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any other kind of cake, but could not, based on his religious 
beliefs, make a cake that supported gay marriage. 
     Significantly, the entire discussion about the wedding cake 
took less than twenty seconds. There was no discussion of what 
words, symbols or designs the couple might want. As far as the 
baker Jack Phillips knew, the cake ultimately requested by the 
couple could have been a plain white one. But the discussion 
never reached that point as Phillips ended it as soon as he 
learned that the men were gay. 
     Ultimately the men did marry and celebrated with a 
wedding cake baked by another store in Colorado. But 
understandably, they did not forget the rejection and 
discrimination they endured. Subsequently, they filed a 
discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division.   
Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute states:  
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a 
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold 
from, or deny to an individual or a group, 
because of . . . sexual orientation . . . the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of a place of public 
accommodation.4 
     The complaint process began by filing with the state’s civil 
rights division, which then investigated and decided whether 
probable cause existed. Here, after probable cause was 
determined, Phillips appealed, thus moving the case before the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, an administrative board 
composed of seven people. During those hearings, which took 
place over a number of days, the Commission heard testimony 
from the men and from Phillips about what had transpired at 
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the bakery. This caused one member of the Commission to 
make the following statement:  
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing 
or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion 
has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination 
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be 
the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list 
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has 
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one 
of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can 
use to—to use their religion to hurt others.5 
     This statement later served as an important lynchpin when 
the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. It formed the 
basis for Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion because 
it showed such disdain for religion thereby precluding a fair 
review of free exercise arguments.  
     The Commission went on to affirm the findings of the 
Division and held that Phillips violated CADA.  It ordered 
Phillips to design wedding cakes for both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples and to train his staff about compliance 
with the discrimination law.  The cake shop appealed that 
decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals where it was again 
upheld 6  and then to the United States Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari. By now, the case had attracted national 
attention. Many organizations weighed in on a variety of 
constitutional issues. Over 100 amicus briefs were filed by 
organizations ranging from the Cato Institute and Foundation 
for Moral Law to the Transgender Law Center and National 
Women’s Law Center, First Amendment advocates, law 
professors and a multitude of religious organizations.  
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PETITIONER PHILLIP’S BRIEF 
     Phillip’s suddenly underwent a complete transformation, 
from a mere baker to a “cake artist.” In the Petition for 
Certiorari, his attorneys described him as, “Designing and 
creating specially commissioned cakes…(as) a form of art 
and creative expression, the pinnacle of which is wedding 
cakes. Phillips pours himself into their design and creation, 
marshaling his time, energy, and creative talents to make a 
one-of-a-kind creation celebrating the couple’s special day 
and reflecting his artistic interpretation of their special 
bond.”7 
     “Coupled with the Petitioner’s artistry: they continued, “is 
the source of his abilities: his deep and abiding religious 
beliefs. Phillips believes that he …honors God through his 
work by declining to use his creative talents to design and 
create cakes that violate his religious beliefs.  This includes 
cakes with offensive written messages and cakes celebrating 
events or ideas …celebrating Halloween (a decision that costs 
him significant revenue), anti-American or antifamily themes, 
atheism, racism, or indecency.” 8 
     By characterizing Jack Phillips as a creative artist and a 
deeply religious man, the stage was set for the legal arguments 
which included three themes. First, that being forced to make a 
cake for a same-sex wedding violated Phillip’s freedom of 
religion; second that forcing him to make the cake interfered 
with his free exercise rights; and third, that forcing him to 
make the cake was in effect making him speak in favor of gay 
marriage. Because the cake would be seen in public and 
everyone would know he made it, he was being forced to 
portray gay marriage positively. In short, the state was coerced 
or compelled his speech.   
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The Free Exercise Argument 
     Scholars may differ on whether or not making a cake is an 
artistic endeavor protected by the First Amendment. But 
assuming that it is, then historically, public accommodation 
laws like Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute have withstood 
First Amendment challenges. If this were not so, then 
discrimination laws would always be subject to a Free Exercise 
Clause argument.   For example, a store owner could deny 
selling to African Americans on the basis of religious beliefs or 
refuse to sell goods to women.  
     The precedent for this is an opinion written by Justice Scalia 
in Employment Division v. Smith. 9 Two men were fired from 
their jobs for smoking peyote. They claimed smoking was part 
of their religious expression. Since the law prohibiting peyote 
“was generally applicable to the public” and did not signal out 
a particular religion, it did not violate the free exercise clause. 
“Generally applicable to the public” is the salient feature when 
determining if a state statute is discriminatory on the basis of 
religion. Since the Colorado statute was generally applicable to 
the public and did not single out a particular religion, then the 
free exercise argument would fail, as the statute trumped the 
free exercise argument.   
The Coerced Speech Argument 
 
     Just as free speech protects the right to make 
pronouncements, so too it protects people from being forced to 
say anything. Forcing people to make speech in favor of the 
government is known as coerced speech.   
     Coerced speech is the opposite of ‘free speech.’ The idea is 
that the government uses the actor to make pronouncements 
he/she would not ordinarily make to advance a cause of the 
state. Thus, by ordering the cake maker to comply with the 
Colorado anti-discrimination statute and make cakes for same-
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sex couples, the state is arguably forcing him to speak in favor 
of same-sex marriage. Is it within the power of the government 
to compel a private citizen “to utter what is not in his mind”? 
     The parameters of coerced speech have been well-defined 
by the court in three cases. In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnett10 the State of West Virginia mandated 
that all students state the pledge of allegiance each morning in 
school. Students who refused to conform were deemed 
insubordinate and faced possible expulsion while their parents 
were subjected to fines and possible jail time. Jehovah’s 
Witnesses brought a lawsuit against West Virginia for violating 
their First Amendment rights because as part of their religious 
beliefs, the flag is an “image” and saluting the flag a “graven 
image” in violation of the Bible’s Exodus Chapter 20. 
Mandating that all students recite the pledge was therefore “a 
compulsion to declare a belief.” 11The Supreme Court agreed 
holding that  
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us. 12 
     Similarly, in Wooley v Maynard,13 Jehovah’s Witnesses 
opposed a New Hampshire statute requiring cars to display a 
license plate with the phrase “Live Free or Die” embossed on 
it. In his affidavit filed with the District Court, Mr. Maynard 
stated, “I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a 
slogan which I find morally, ethically, religiously and 
politically abhorrent.” 14Likening the license plate to a “mobile 
billboard” for the state’s ideological message the court held 
that the “State may not constitutionally require an individual to 
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participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by 
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the 
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.” 15 
The court compared the case to Barnette, finding that the state 
was again forcing citizens to be instruments of adherence to an 
ideological point of view. “In doing so, the State invades the 
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control. The right to speak and the right to refrain from 
speaking are complementary components of the broader 
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.”16 
     Of the three cases, perhaps the most important one dealing 
with coerced speech is Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 17Here, an unincorporated 
association (the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council 
referred to as the Alliance) was authorized by the City of 
Boston to organize and conduct the annual St. Patrick’s Day 
Parade. As such, the Alliance was responsible for deciding 
what groups could march in the parade. They issued an 
invitation to members of the public inviting them to march in 
the parade and accepted nearly every group that applied except 
the LGBT group. 18 
     The Massachusetts courts held that the parade organizers 
had engaged in unlawful discrimination and ordered them to 
include the group.  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 
It explained that the state applied its public accommodation 
law “in a peculiar way,” 19when it required the parade 
organizers to alter the content of their expression to 
accommodate “any contingent of protected individuals with a 
message,” 20This violated the First Amendment right of 
speakers “to choose the content of [their] own message,” and 
decide “what merits celebration,”21 even if the state or some 
individuals deem those choices “misguided, or even hurtful.” 22 
111 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies  
 
 
 
     Hurley is especially applicable to Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
because it  is one of the few examples of  free speech principles 
overriding a state discrimination law. Hurley established that 
“the state cannot apply a public-accommodation law to force 
individuals engaged in expression to alter what they 
communicate, much less to celebrate something that they deem 
objectionable. This is particularly true for speakers, like the 
parade organizers in Hurley, who exclude no class of people 
but merely decline to express certain ideas. Similarly, it could 
be argued that the cake maker would be forced to alter what he 
(normally) communicated on his cakes if the court enforced the 
Colorado statute against his business.  
 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT MAJORITY DECISION 
     Justice Kennedy wrote for a 7-2 majority reversing the 
decision of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. At first 
blush, the reversal appears to allow Masterpiece Cakeshop to 
discriminate against customers based on sexual orientation. Yet 
the court never reached a decision about whether the bakery’s 
free exercise and free speech rights were violated. The court 
never addressed the substantive questions in the case.  
     In his opinion, Justice Kennedy began by reassuring the 
LGBT community.  \ 
 Our society has come to the recognition that gay 
persons and gay couples cannot   treated as social 
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the 
 laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances 
must, protect them in the  exercise of their civil rights. The 
exercise of their freedom on terms equal to  others must be 
given great weight and respect by the courts.23 
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     The primary issue in the case, and the one that most 
followers of the court had hoped would be resolved was 
whether places of public accommodation, like a store, give up 
religious beliefs in favor of protected classes? Could the owner 
of a cake shop refuse to make a wedding cake for a gay couple 
despite Colorado’s statutory protection of gays at places of 
public accommodation?   
     As a rule, when there is a clash between business owners 
and protected classes, the protected classes will prevail as long 
as the statute giving them protection is not an arbitrary or 
biased law.  “While those religious and philosophical 
objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections 
do not allow business owners and  other actors in the economy 
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods 
and services under a neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations law.”24 What constitutes a ‘neutral and 
generally applicable public accommodations law’ becomes key 
in deciding the outcome.   
     Phillip’s case, however, might be an exception according to 
Kennedy,  because “the baker found it difficult to find a line 
where the customers’ rights to goods and services became a 
demand for him to exercise the right of his own personal 
expression for their message, a message he could not express in 
a way consistent with his religious beliefs.”25 And it was 
exactly that decision that provoked such interest in the case. If 
on the one hand the statute is enforced, then the free exercise 
clause does not protect one’s religious interests; but if religion 
is allowed to excuse shopkeepers from compliance, this allows 
shopkeepers to discriminate with impunity.  
     Unfortunately, the court never reached the issue of free 
speech, freedom or religion or whether the statute was ‘neutral 
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and generally applicable.’ And herein lies the disappointment 
with the decision. The court harkened all the way back to the 
hearing that had taken place many years before at the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission. Recall that when the case was 
initially reviewed there, one of the commissioners made the 
following statement:  
 We can list hundreds of situations where freedom of 
religion has been used to  justify  discrimination. And to me 
it is one of the most despicable pieces of  rhetoric that 
people  can use to—to use their religion to hurt others. 26 
     The court found this statement was evidence of a profound 
disrespect for the baker’s sincere religious beliefs, thus tainting 
the board’s decision.  “The baker was entitled to a neutral 
decision maker who would give full and fair consideration to 
his religious objection.”27  The “clear and impermissible 
hostility” violated the baker’s free exercise rights. Because the 
hearing board’s conduct was prejudiced against the cake 
maker, the court did not reach a decision weighing the statute 
against free exercise rights.  
The delicate question of when the free exercise of his 
religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of 
state power needed to be determined in an adjudication 
in which religious hostility on the part of the state itself 
would not be a factor in the balance the state sought to 
reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. 
When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
considered this case, it did not do so with the religious 
neutrality that the Constitution requires.28 
     The court said that the inconsistent treatment by the Civil 
Rights Commission showed hostility towards Phillips’ 
religious faith. Colorado had violated its duty “not to base laws 
or regulations on hostility to a religion or a religious 
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viewpoint.”29 The state must “proceed in a manner neutral 
toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.” The 
commission had been “neither tolerant nor respectful”; it had 
proceeded on the basis of “a negative normative ‘evaluation of 
the justification’ for his objection” (quoting Lukumi). As a 
result, the court did not further examine the free exercise 
issues, leaving the question of which should prevail---the state 
discrimination statute or the Petitioner’s religious rights---
unanswered.   
     Finally, because the Colorado Commission had engaged in 
discriminatory behavior toward Phillips (the baker), the Court 
overturned the decision of the Commission. This left no other 
options for the Mullins and Craig to appeal or have a re-
hearing, to a close their discrimination complaint.  
The Kagan Concurrence 
 
     Justice Kagan explained in her concurrence that she 
wished to elaborate on one basis of the Court’s holding. 
She wanted to distinguish the current case from one 
involving “three other bakers” also in Colorado, a case that 
was working its way through the courts around the same 
time as Masterpiece. The “three bakers” refers to a case 
involving a man named Mr. Jack who went to three 
different Denver, Colorado bakeries and asked each one to 
make him a cake that included two Bible verses: “God 
hates sin. Psalm 45:7” and “Homosexuality is a detestable 
sin. Leviticus 18:2[2]” and then place two grooms holding 
hands on the top with a red “X” placed over them.30 Each 
of the three bakeries refused and Mr. Jack then brought his 
case to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and Division 
claiming religious discrimination.  
 
     In direct contravention to its holding in Masterpiece, the 
Commission and Division both held that the three bakeries 
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did not violate Colorado’s discrimination statute. This was so 
because the bakeries could refuse to sell cakes with these 
particular messages to any customer requesting them.   
 
     To Kagan, the standard that the public accommodations 
law must be “neutral and generally applicable” means that all 
customers who come into a store must be treated the same.  
Therefore, she saw no contradiction between Masterpiece 
and the “three bakeries.” In Masterpiece, the bakery was in 
the wrong because it would make wedding cakes for some 
people (heterosexuals) but not others (homosexuals); this 
disparate treatment is discrimination. But in the “three 
bakeries” none of the bakeries would make the cakes with the 
hateful sayings on them for any customers, thereby treating 
all customers the same. Therefore, the “three bakeries” did 
not discriminate. 
 
 
The Gorsuch Concurrence 
     Justice Gorsuch on the other hand, disagreed with Kagan’s 
analysis. He emphasized the viewpoint of each cake maker and 
whether the requested cake violated that person’s own beliefs. 
For example, in the “three bakers case” Mr. Jack requested 
cakes with messages inscribed on them denigrating same-sex 
marriage. All three bakeries refused because they the bakers, 
found the request offensive to their own beliefs. Gorsuch then 
compared the three bakers’ refusal to that of Mr. Phillips, who 
declined to make a cake with a message in favor of same-sex 
marriage, because it violated his own beliefs. How could the 
three bakeries be free from discrimination for refusing to make 
the cakes when Phillips was discriminatory for refusing to 
make the cake? Those are opposite results for the same act.   
To Gorsuch this contradiction by the Commission showed that 
it made its decisions based on whether or not it agreed with the 
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message. “The Commission could not have it both ways, 
setting a different standard when the message was one the 
Commission supported (the “three bakers”) but finding 
discrimination when the request went against gay people. 
Gorsuch likened the Commission’s actions to a sliding scale 
that resulted in unfair and disparate decisions based on the 
Commission’s own prejudice. 
The Ginsberg Dissent 
Justice Ginsberg, in contrast to Gorsuch, viewed this case from 
the standard of equal treatment.  When the baker refused to 
make a cake for the two men, it was not the message on the 
cake, but their status as a gay couple that was significant. 
Phillips discriminated because he would make a wedding cake 
for some people (heterosexuals) but not others (homosexuals). 
Treating people differently because of their sexual orientation 
is a violation of the Colorado statute and thus the case should 
not have been overturned by the Supreme Court.  
In the Mr. Jack case, the baker refused to make a cake with a 
hateful message. Because that baker would not make the 
“hateful cake” for anyone; therefore, all customers were treated 
equally. Since they were all treated equally, no one was 
discriminated against and there was no statutory violation. The 
Commission should have found such.  
In short, it is not about speech or religion, but rather how the 
law is applied that matters, and equal treatment under the law is 
the test of discrimination.   
 
CONCLUSION 
     Shortly after filing his Petition with the Supreme Court, 
Jack Phillips received a call at his bakery. This time the person 
on the other end of the phone asked Phillips if he would make 
her a cake with a blue exterior and a pink interior. Then the 
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caller disclosed that the color scheme represented her transition 
from a male to a female. Phillips declined to make the cake 31 
citing his religious beliefs as the reason.  
     This time, Phillips took the offensive and filed a lawsuit in 
Federal District Court in Denver alleging that Colorado 
officials are on a “crusade” against him. He argued that 
because he refuses to make cakes that violate his religious 
beliefs, the state is “out to get him”. In recent years, his 
lawyers say, he has been targeted by potential customers eager 
to test the limit of the law.32 
     There is a very good reason that Phillips is back in court so 
soon after the Supreme Court decision. The court failed to 
answer the most important question at the heart of the case, 
namely, can places of public accommodation discriminate 
against protected classes? Instead the court chose to side-step 
the question. What impact does this have? For Phillips, he has 
become a target by anyone in the LGBT community who wants 
to prove a point and use him to litigate. For those not inclined 
to personally test the law, the door appears to be open to use 
religion as a reason to discriminate with impunity. One can 
imagine numerous scenarios in which business owners profess 
a religious belief to avoid serving any number of people. A dry 
cleaner who hates Muslims can claim his religion does not 
permit him to clean clothes of another faith; a doctor may 
refuse to treat a pregnant woman who is not married on 
religious grounds; the list is endless. Since the court provided 
no guidance on the issue, nor admonishment of Phillip’s 
actions toward the gay men, there appears to be at least a tacit 
nod of approval for his role in violating the statute and 
blatantly discriminating.  
      Not only may the court be reflecting its own conservatism, 
but the allowance of discrimination and bigotry may also 
reflect the country’s leaning toward a more conservative view 
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of gay rights. A poll taken after the Masterpiece decision 
showed that close to half of all Americans (46 %) believe that 
the owners of “wedding-based businesses, such as caterers and 
bakers, should be allowed to refuse service to same-sex couples 
if doing so violates their religious beliefs.” 33 The poll was 
conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute and it 
contains alarming information including data that shows 
“Black American’s support for conservative business owners 
like Phillips rose from 36% in 2017 to 45% this year while 
Hispanic Americans support rose from 26 percent to 34 
percent.” 34 Given the history of discrimination against Blacks 
and Hispanics, the fact that these groups support discrimination 
against another protected class is surprising. 
     Some court watchers believe that Masterpiece II will likely 
end up at the Supreme Court, but the decision this time will 
address religion and discrimination against gays. Given the 
conservative nature of the court, that may not be good news for 
the LGBT community. If public perception is any indication of 
where the court would land, religious freedom certainly seems 
to be the “winner.” Just look at recent headlines regarding the 
second case against the baker:  
• Colorado end your crusade against 
Masterpiece Cakeshop35. 
• Colorado Hauls Vindicated Christian 
Baker Back to Court.36 
• Hostility Unabated: Colorado seeks to 
punish cake artist Jack Phillips37 
 
If the past behavior of the court is any indication, then the fact 
the court found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
showed prejudice based on one statement made by a  
Commission member regarding the use of religion to justify 
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discrimination is alarming. Compare that finding to the court’s 
reasoning in Trump v. Hawaii, upholding the Muslim travel 
ban. In that case, despite President Trump’s frequent anti-
Muslim statements, the court voted   5-4 to impose a travel ban. 
This is clearly irrational when on the one hand a statement by a 
commissioner results in a finding of religious hostility but an 
entire political campaign and election based on banning a 
religious groups is not hostile. “In contrast to Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the evidence of anti-religious animus in the Muslim 
ban case is unambiguous and consistent. And it all flows from 
President Trump, the person singularly responsible for the 
policy. He formally called for a “shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States” in a statement that remained on his 
campaign website well into his presidency.”38  
     Finally, if the Supreme Court does allow shop owners to use 
religion as a basis for discrimination, it is difficult to see where 
any limits would exist. Once the doors are open to discriminate 
against one group, then the underpinnings are in place to 
extend legalized discrimination against others. One reason for 
the supposed equal application of the law is to prevent such an 
outcome. Yet, given the actions of this court, the likelihood of 
a future outcome consistent with precedent seems unlikely.  
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